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Revolt of the Generals: A Case
Study in Professional Ethics
MARTIN L. COOK

“Let’s see who we’ve got here tonight. General Moseley, Air Force Chief of
Staff. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They still
support Rumsfeld. Right, you guys aren’t retired yet, right? Right, they still
support Rumsfeld. Look, by the way, I’ve got a theory about how to handle
these retired generals causing all this trouble: don’t let them retire! Come
on, we’ve got a stop-loss program; let’s use it on these guys.”
– Comedian Stephen Colbert
2006 White House Correspondents’ Dinner

T

he fact that a joke like that could be told in front of an audience including
the President, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Chief of
Staff, and many other Washington dignitaries spoke volumes for the state of
relations between senior military leaders and their civilian superiors. For
those recently retired general officers who chose to go public with their criticisms of then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (and by implication the
Iraq policy), clearly the situation had reached a point where they felt it was
part of their obligation to the profession of arms and the American people to
dissent. Such intense criticism from military officers who previously held positions of great responsibility in implementing the Administration’s policies
is something rarely seen in American history. This article will attempt to assess the ethical considerations that bear on officers contemplating such action
in any future civil-military crisis.

Military Professionalism
The question of the nature of military professionalism and the distinctive demands of professional obligations has received considerable analysis in
recent years. By far the greatest contribution to this discussion has been from the
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Army, centered on the Army Professionalism project at West Point which culminated in the publication of The Future of the Army Profession.1 The impetus for
that project and a series of related articles was a fear that Army officers were losing a sense of their profession and its obligations and risked becoming, in the
words of Dr. Don Snider, the project director, “a merely obedient bureaucracy.”
In the face of that perceived risk, Snider (and the many other authors
on the project) called for a renewed sense of the distinctive features of a profession, including commitment to a body of abstract knowledge that the profession is obligated to apply and improve. That knowledge, the authors
argued, constitutes the unique expertise of the profession and commitment to
it, the touchstone of intellectual independence required of the profession.
An implication of that line of reasoning was that the profession’s
members have an ethical obligation to apply existing professional knowledge
to the highest degree possible when confronted with operational challenges,
while maintaining an ability to adapt that knowledge to novel requirements and
operational demands. Because the project’s analysis is linked to the particular
theory of professions developed by Andrew Abbott, who views professions as
engaged diachronically in a struggle for professional “jurisdiction,” this aspect
of the analysis highlighted the need for any profession to “adapt or die” as it
evolves in competition with other claimants on the expertise relevant to its own
historical area of expertise.2
On the other side of this debate, there was a perception in the administration of President Clinton that a good deal of the military disrespected the President personally and disapproved of his uses of military force, especially in the
Balkans. Such interventions placed the military in a role that many within the
profession considered inappropriate for a military focused on “fighting and winning America’s wars” (what then-Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki referred to as “the Army’s non-negotiable contract with the American people”).
It was in that environment that a number of writers penned cautions
that the essential subordination of the military to civilian leadership was in
question. The most comprehensive and strident of these analyses were those
of Thomas Ricks in his novel A Soldier’s Duty, which imagined the military’s
deliberate evasion of orders from its military superiors, and of Professor
Richard H. Kohn at the University of North Carolina. 3
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More recently, a number of voices have been raised arguing that professional military advice was not heeded by the Bush Administration’s civilian leadership.4 The concern was virtually the opposite of that voiced during
the Clinton years. Instead of choosing insubordination, the claim was that by
deferring to the strongly held convictions regarding novel ways of warfighting on the part of Secretary Rumsfeld and others in the hierarchy, the
military’s leadership accepted war plans and troop numbers at variance with
their best professional judgment.5
It was in this context that several authors argued that the process of congressional oversight of military affairs was badly broken, for two reasons: Congress had largely abdicated its responsibility in recent years, and the culture of
the officer corps had evolved an excessive sense of obligation to the Executive
branch of government, thereby neglecting the equal if not greater responsibility
to give forthright and honest military assessments to Congress.6 That, these authors argued, was a venue in which it was part of a senior officer’s professional
obligation to give his or her unvarnished professional opinion to congressional
members and hearings.
For nearly a decade, H. R. McMaster’s book Dereliction of Duty
has deeply informed the ethos and self-understanding of the officer corps. 7
McMaster’s demonstration of the complicity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
the formulation and continuance of misguided policies in Vietnam has
served as a cautionary tale in many thoughtful officers’ minds. According to
General Anthony Zinni, former commander of US Central Command,
“[then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General Hugh Shelton sent
copies of McMaster’s book to every four-star general in the US military.
The message to us, after we heard this from Hugh Shelton, is that will never happen here. And the message to us from Secretary [William S.] Cohen at that time,
too, is that the door is always open, and your obligation to the Congress, which is
an obligation to the American people to tell them what you think, still stands
strong. And that’s the expectation that we have. They did not ever want to hear
that we had a problem, something sticking in our craw, that we didn’t bring up to
them, that we didn’t honestly express if we felt it had to be expressed.8

As Richard Kohn summarized the “lesson learned” from McMaster’s
analysis, “There was a deep bitterness over Vietnam and the way the [service]
chiefs had been co-opted. . . . [Army officers] said, ‘We’re never going to put up
with this again, we’re not going to be put in that position again by civilians.’” 9
A new dimension to this debate emerged two years ago with the public
criticism of Administration policy and of Secretary Rumsfeld in particular by a
number of recently retired flag officers. In almost every case these officers had
been in the inner circle of policy formation or execution of the Administration.10
6
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This level of public criticism and dissent from such a large number of highly
placed military leaders immediately following their service is without precedent. Never in American history have so many senior military leaders, apparently devoid of partisan political motive, felt the need or obligation to speak out
publicly regarding policy and leadership during an ongoing conflict.
The novelty of this event in the midst of the extended debate about the
obligations and nature of military professionalism cries out for normative analysis. Is such criticism, at least on some understandings of the circumstances and
motives of the critics, indeed a manifestation of the highest standards of military
professionalism? Or is it, on the contrary, a kind of reprehensible and unprofessional insubordination to duly elected political leaders and their appointees?11
It is important to set aside a number of potentially distracting related
questions before launching into a normative analysis of this issue. First, there is
no question whatsoever of the legal right de facto of such officers to say anything
they wish.12 De facto because, as Richard Swain has recently argued, retired officers, since they are still technically part of the military and receiving military
pay, might arguably be bound by exactly the same rules as serving officers. But
there has never been any inclination to take that view of the matter from the legal
community. As retired officers, they regain full First Amendment liberties that
are necessarily somewhat curtailed while they are in uniform. Second, retired
flag officers using their moral and political weight to attempt to influence political matters have already become a routine event. Every presidential candidate in
recent years has organized retired senior officers to offer endorsements. Surely,
one might argue, if it is acceptable for retired officers to use their status in this
way for generalized partisan political endorsement, it should be orders of magnitude more appropriate for them to offer criticisms of political leaders and policies narrowly focused on areas of their specific military expertise.13
Many observers have roundly criticized those retired officers on a
number of counts. Dr. Don Snider, in an unpublished talk at West Point, argued that such criticism undermines the confidence of young officers, who
might think “Did he really feel this way when I was fighting for him in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and if he did why did he not resign right then?” 14
Even more scathingly, Dr. Snider cited Samuel Huntington’s classic
statement that military people should stay out of political matters entirely,
and asserted that the revolt of the generals “. . . casts the Army profession, and
its current strategic leadership (too timid to speak out like us) in a very negative light.” 15 In this assessment, the retired general officer critics are crossing
a line demarcating political judgment from proper military expertise that
ought, in Snider’s assessment, to be a sharp and clear distinction.
Lastly, before turning to a normative analysis of the problem, it is
important to acknowledge and then try to set aside the specific political judgSpring 2008
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ments regarding the war in Iraq. Now that the United States is five years into
it, clearly almost all the assumptions on which it was based (both in terms of
the justifying causes and the predictions of how it would play out) have been
shown to be incorrect, leaving to future historians the task of determining
what proportions were a result of self-delusion, duplicity, or honest mistakes.
Others, of course, have and will judge these matters differently. While
it is important to acknowledge that these judgments and the feelings surrounding
them are deeply divisive to American society, the purpose of this article is not
criticism or defense of specific judgments. Rather, the task at hand is to try, even
in the midst of political passions, to extend the normative thinking regarding
military professionalism that has been so helpfully advanced in recent years.

Toward a Normative Analysis
One way to try to approach a problem in principle is to frame it as a
hypothetical situation. It is important, of course, that the hypothetical be
plausible in real-world terms and further, since this discussion arises from
specific events, that it be at least one possible interpretation of those events.
On the other hand, the advantage of the hypothetical framing of the issue is
that it allows us to state the issue as a matter of in-principle terms rather than
be bogged down with every detail of specific personalities and events.
Suppose you’re a general officer who has given frequent and repeated
advice to political leadership regarding the military feasibility of operational and
strategic goals. Suppose your advice is firm that the goals sought cannot be attained by the military means the civilian leaders are willing to commit, or not attainable (in your judgment) by military means at all. Of course, one can deploy
forces in pursuit of those goals. It’s just that, in your opinion, all efforts will be
expended in a futile end. In particular, your advice about the size and composition of the force required to have any hope of achieving the stated goals is completely disregarded in favor of an employment you believe is doomed to fail.
Once it became clear that the political leadership thought otherwise,
you saluted smartly and did your best to carry out the administration’s bidding.
Now, you find yourself a couple of years into that deployment and having a severe case of “I told you so.” You believe even more strongly now then when
you gave the advice at the beginning, that your initial opinions were correct.
At the outset, you told yourself, “I could be mistaken,” and “Perhaps
the political leadership knows something I don’t know.” By now it’s apparent
you were initially correct and the political leadership did not in fact know
anything that would have changed your judgment.
So in your judgment the continuance of current policy will never
achieve political goals and will result in continually mounting casualties and
degradation of your service’s equipment, readiness, etc. Furthermore, you’re
8
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aware that there are other threats that, because you’re deployed on this one,
you couldn’t possibly find the resources to deal with militarily if you had to.
In such a circumstance, what do you do? Are you exactly where
McMaster put the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Vietnam? What are your options? You
can continue to go along, digging deeper into what you consider an impossible
situation. You can’t overtly criticize policy in uniform except, perhaps, by using your congressional testimony opportunities to give your unvarnished opinions. Needless to say, if the issue at stake is a mere garden-variety disagreement
regarding policy, no deep moral dilemma is involved. But if the policy is, in
your carefully examined opinion, over a matter of extreme importance and
threatens significant and long-term costs to the military, national interest, and
health of the body politic, a genuine dilemma arises.
If you retire, might it not in fact be part of your continuing professional obligation and your responsibility to your friends and troops still serving to try to extricate them from this situation? Might it not also be important
for the future credibility of the military and its leadership to show independent professional judgment in such a situation rather than appear to be going
along, only to have the historians document that the military leadership was
yet again complicit concerning the realities it faced?
These are difficult questions. Furthermore, one is rightly hesitant to
make an argument that insubordination is the correct choice, because the risk is
large that doing so will be construed as permission for military leaders to routinely and publicly dissent from the policies of elected political leaders. So if one
is to make a case for public dissent of any sort, it has to be hedged with qualifiers
and cautions. Any such argument pertains only to the most extreme situations
where, in the conscientious judgment of the senior leader, what is at stake is the
fundamental security of the United States and the constitutional processes.
As was mentioned earlier, at one extreme of the debate is the position
articulated by Richard Swain. Swain argues strongly (and cites law) to make the
point that retired officers are in every sense still members of the armed forces. He
correctly points out that they are subject to recall to active duty, take pay as retirees, and still hold commissions. Therefore, he argues they are subject to exactly
the same restrictions as active-duty personnel. Swain writes:
[I]t is at least a false proposition that upon retirement officers revert to full civilian status in so far as the obligations they undertook at their commissioning.
Retirement is not resignation. It is a matter of fact, not interpretation, that retired officers remain members of the armed forces by law and regulation. . . .
[U]nless like George Washington they lay down their commissions by resignation, it is reasonable to assume that they remain at least ethically obliged to observe the limitations imposed by commissioned service, accepted by the oath
they made and commission they still hold.16
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While Swain makes a strong legal case, actual practice clearly tolerates much wider latitude in conduct by retired officers than the standard he articulates. Further, properly used, the expertise of retired officers who are freer
to speak on policy than they were in uniform appears on balance a valuable
national resource for informing public debate regarding those policies. Deprived of such input, the nation would have only the government’s position
and the comparatively non-expert opinion of nonmilitary commentators. Any
attempt to make Swain’s standard the reality would almost certainly be used
selectively by civilian superiors eager to silence retired-officer critics, while
encouraging their supporters to continue as advocates.
At the other extreme is the view derived from some interpretations
of McMaster’s book. In that view, senior leaders who have strong dissenting
perspectives from an administration’s policy have an obligation to speak out
or resign in protest. Determined not ever again to be the moral equivalents to
President Lyndon Johnson’s “five silent men” (as the JCS were called), defenders of this view hark back to General Harold K. Johnson’s retrospective
reflections on his own silence:
I remember the day I was ready to go over to the Oval Office and give my four
stars to the President and tell him, “You have refused to tell the country they
cannot fight a war without mobilization; you have required me to send men into
battle with little hope of their ultimate victory; and you have forced us in the
military to violate almost every one of the principles of war in Vietnam. Therefore, I resign and will hold a press conference after I walk out of your door.” 17

Of course neither General Johnson nor any other senior leader did
any such thing during the Vietnam conflict. For many readers, the lesson they
at least think they learn from McMaster is that, should equivalent events occur on their watch, they should be prepared to submit their resignations.
Chairman Shelton’s comments, quoted from General Zinni previously, certainly seem to imply a readiness on his part to take precisely that course of action, should the occasion have arisen.
Retired Navy chaplain (Captain) George M. Clifford III attempts to
provide the kind of fine-grained ethical analysis this particular situation requires. He distinguishes four categories of issues which might raise the dissent issue in increasing levels of severity:
 An assigned responsibility the officer can perform with minimal
moral discomfort.
 An assigned responsibility the officer can perform only with substantial moral discomfort.
 An assigned responsibility the officer can perform only at the cost
of significantly compromising his or her moral standards.
10
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An assigned responsibility the officer cannot perform.18
The easy cases (at least theoretically) are the first and last categories.
The first is easy because the officer’s objection is not morally significant; the
last is easy because it rises to the category of “illegal orders” which officers
are expected to disobey. 19
The difficult categories are the second and third. Obviously, there is
no way to sharply demarcate between these categories, and individual officers will draw the line in their own lives and conduct differently. As Clifford
writes, “No officer, of any grade, who has a strong sense of morality will
likely serve for very long without being assigned a responsibility to which he
or she morally objects. Yet unless the situation involves grave consequences
for others or the nation, the nation rightly expects military officers to do their
duty”—i.e., obey.20 In other words, if the moral difficulty remains in the “category two” level for given officers, they should subordinate their own moral
judgment to the necessities of obedience and good order.
The dilemma posed by the third category cannot be so blithely dismissed. While there is no bright line indicating when an issue is moving to
this level of discomfort, as Clifford notes, it deals mostly with “the degree and
amount of harm or other evil caused by complying with an assigned responsibility.”21 Minimally, an officer confronting a very high degree of harm which
he or she perceives to be the consequence of a policy from which the officer
strongly dissents has the obligation to make every effort to be heard. Of
course, an officer owes loyalty to civilian superiors, but there are other competing loyalties at work too: to military subordinates, to the health of the military services themselves, and to the long-term health of the perception of the
moral integrity of the military services by their fellow citizens.
Of course, the “obligation to make every effort to be heard” should,
in almost every case, be in unambiguously appropriate venues. What are
those? Behind closed doors with other senior leaders one would expect and
hope for candid discussion by participants. Obviously (although in practice
more difficult to accomplish well), candor is appropriate before appropriate
bodies of Congress, where senior leaders are expected and required to give
honest military assessments.22 In the ideal situation, all participants would
emerge from these discussions feeling that they had expressed their opinions,
they had been “heard” at the appropriate level, and were satisfied that even if
the decision were not in their favor, they could understand and accept the
rationale.
What about the case when all does not go so well? In an article, retired General Richard Myers and Dick Kohn argue that “there was no ‘truce’
between the military and civilians after 9/11 because there had never been a
war. There was just the friction and distrust (never open but exacerbated by
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Rumsfeld’s approach and style) inherent in US civil-military relations.” 23 In
other words, in their analysis, the situation was not a crisis in civil-military relations, but only a somewhat extreme position on the normal scale of tension
inherent in the American system.
Clearly, the senior officers who publicly dissented did not view the
situation in that way. One of them, in a private conversation, called it a “constitutional crisis” and argued that only such a grave situation could possibly
have motivated him to breach the normal self-restraint of self-expression by
officers. What kind of disagreement might warrant the conclusion that the situation was so extreme and placed the decision firmly in Clifford’s third category of moral objection?
The first such case is so extreme that one might argue it falls into the
illegal order category—although not according to the common definition of
illegal orders, to violate the jus in bello rules of just war. The Nüremberg
Trials distinguished three distinct categories of war crimes. The more familiar are violations of the law of war and crimes against humanity. The third,
crimes against peace, is defined as “(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances; (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).” 24
Although it is hard to know precisely what retired Lieutenant General
Greg Newbold, one of the critics, meant when he described Iraq as “an unnecessary war,” it is reasonable to interpret him as saying that his continued participation in planning the war would mean he was taking part in a war crime of this
type. For the purposes of moral analysis, the analyst does not have to determine
whether he or she agrees with that assessment, but only that (if this is the correct interpretation) General Newbold sincerely believes it to be the case. That
no one in the US government is likely to be prosecuted for such a crime in the
current geopolitical environment is also irrelevant. One can certainly see why
an officer who believes the situation approaches this level would be, at a minimum, in Clifford’s category three of moral distress.
Another area where public dissent should at least be entertained
when appropriate is the case where an officer is as cognizant as possible of the
details of the war plan and, in the full exercise of his or her professional military judgment, honestly believes the plan will have disastrous consequences
for the nation and the forces about to be committed. This is not a matter of the
plan having simple flaws or weaknesses. Rather, the case has to appear as
much as possible (for a matter which is inherently a matter of professional
judgment) to being a recipe for disaster according to every principle of professional military judgment available to the officer. Here, surely, if the standard for officers is to exercise professional judgment rather than lapse into the
12
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role of merely obedient bureaucrats, this is the moment where they are expected to not willingly participate in executing the plan.
Officers’ sincere belief (even if objectively mistaken) that they are
in such a situation justifies their taking advantage of the opportunity to leave
their positions (if permissible by law). At the senior level, it is apparent that
retirements requested for such reasons will normally be granted—if only for
the practical reason that no one would want a plan executed by an officer who
has no faith in it.
What about the last step: publicly criticizing leaders and plans from
the newly acquired position of the retired officer? Any rationale supporting
this should, of course, be developed grudgingly for all the excellent reasons
the critics of the “revolt of the generals” cite. An absolute rule against such
proclamation, however, flies in the face of any notion of fundamental moral
responsibility and loyalty to the nation and Constitution. There can be no algorithmic rule, of course, to determine the proper threshold for such extraordinary dissent. Chaplain Clifford, in fact, moves to an analysis of the virtues
of prudence, courage, and temperance in an attempt to guide such choices, in
the end, concurring with Aristotle’s claims about such virtues remaining
valid: There is no rule for them, except “we know virtue when we see it.”
It is on this point that Clifford faults General Newbold. He writes,
“General Newbold’s decision to retire in 2002 exemplifies the inadequacy of
[the option of just retiring]. His departure caused no waves and apparently did
not prompt a reexamination of the policies and plans with which he so vehemently disagreed.”25
Instead, Clifford argues:
If [Newbold] could have made a persuasive case against the policies and plans
he found morally objectionable without revealing classified information, then,
given the magnitude of the issues at stake, he should have [resigned and spoken
out] instead of [merely retiring]. That failure points to deficiencies in one or
more of these three virtues: prudence (lacked wisdom to see the full importance
of the issues at the time he resigned), courage (too timid), or temperance (too
concerned about his position on the team or future influence).26

Although seemingly a harsh judgment, everything in the argument
developed to this point suggests it is correct. To approve such a position is to
run great risk of appearing to countenance insubordination whenever there is
dissent regarding policy. Clearly, that is not intended, and the author has argued elsewhere against such dissent. 27
In any profession, there are situations where the clearly foreseeable
negative consequences of playing by the professional rules are so great that
prudence expects those rules to be set aside. For example, a court case in CaliSpring 2008
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fornia ruled that, although psychiatrists have a near absolute requirement of
confidentiality toward their patients, that requirement must be set aside when
warning potential victims of violence can save lives, adding a “duty to warn”
to the moral requirements of the profession. 28
Similarly, if the intellectual component of military professionalism
means anything, it encompasses rare cases of unambiguous bad military judgments that promise to have disastrous consequences. In such cases the obligations of military professionals, precisely because they are professionals and
not merely obedient bureaucrats, need to exceed the conduct governed by rules
derived from more routine contexts.
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